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Your Data for Law Enforcement
Chris Jay Hoofnagle*
ABSTRACT
Lawmakers should revisit federal privacy laws to account for
private-sector database companies that sell personal information to
the government for law enforcement purposes. Commercial data
brokers (CDBs) operate websites tailored to law enforcement that
enable police to download comprehensive dossiers on almost any
adult. The CDBs have artfully dodged privacy laws, leaving a
void where individuals' personal information may be sold and
accessed without adequate protections, and creating serious risks
to privacy and due process. The author argues that CDBs have
become arms of the government because they perform law
enforcement functions for the police, and thus should be required
to comply with the Privacy Act of 1974. Furthermore, the nation
should revisit policies surrounding access to public records, as the
dossiers increasingly are drawn from public registers.
I. Introduction
Traditionally, law enforcement officers obtained information
by speaking with suspects' neighbors, employers, or friends. They
would analyze paper arrest records and crime reports. In order to
obtain personal information stored in private databases, they
would have to call a variety of different vendors.
The shift to a digital environment has brought many changes to
law enforcement's collection of information. Now, by visiting a
single website, such as www.cpgov.com, law enforcement can
. Associate Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). EPIC is a public
interest research center in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public
attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment,
and constitutional values. I wish to thank Woodrow Neal Hartzog, a candidate for
LL.M. at The George Washington Law School, for his research and comment on this
article.
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obtain a comprehensive dossier on almost any adult. That website
was custom-tailored for law enforcement by ChoicePoint, Inc.
(ChoicePoint), a commercial data broker (CDB).
CDBs make available a wide variety of information, from
arrest and court records to notice that a suspect has opened a
private mailbox. Access to private sector databases has
significantly altered the balance of power between law
enforcement and the individual. As one internal document from
the United States Marshals Service (USMS) put it:
With as little as a first name or a partial address, you can obtain
a comprehensive personal profile in minutes. The profile
includes personal identifying information (name, alias name,
date of birth, social security number), all known addresses,
drivers license information, vehicle information... telephone
numbers, corporations, business affiliations, aircraft, boats,
assets, professional licenses, concealed weapons permits, liens,
judgments, lawsuits, marriages, worker compensation claims,
etc.1
This new power has been made possible by the confluence of
fast network connections, the availability of public records, both
electronic and paper, that are rich with personal information,2 and
the alacrity of companies that have become very profitable from
selling personal data to the government.
A number of risks to due process and privacy are raised by the
collection and maintenance of information. The information could
be used for political or personal purposes. Examples of police
misuse of databases abound in the media, with violations found
involving street-level local police officers to Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officers. There is also a general risk that the collection of
information on individuals will upset the balance between
I Sole Source Justification for Autotrack (Database Technologies) (n.d.)
(document obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
cpusms7.30.02j.pdf [hereinafter Sole Source Justification for Autotrack (Database
Technologies)].
2 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1084 (2002); see Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137,
1152-54 (2002) (explaining how the digitization of records has made personal
information documents more accessible and less secure) [hereinafter Access and
Aggregation].
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government and individuals, resulting in a shift of power that is
oppressive. In a report mandated by the Privacy Act of 1974,' the
Privacy Protection Study Commission highlighted this risk:
In a larger context, Americans must also be concerned about the
long-term effect record-keeping practices can have not only on
relationships between individuals and organizations, but also on
the balance of power between government and the rest of
society. Accumulations of information about individuals tend to
enhance authority by making it easier for authority to reach
individuals directly. Thus, growth in society's record-keeping
capability poses the risk that existing power balances will be
upset.
4
There is nothing inherently wrong with law enforcement
buying access to CDBs. After all, the private sector provides law
enforcement with many tools, including pistols and batons. But
there are strict rules for the use of these police tools. There is
training to help ensure that pistols are only fired with justification,
and that batons are employed properly. If these tools are misused,
there are serious repercussions, including the discipline or
dismissal of the officer and section 1983 lawsuits.5 The Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is exploring whether similar
substantive and procedural safeguards are in place for law
enforcement officers who use CDBs to gain access to personal
information. Specifically, EPIC is evaluating what, if any,
safeguards are in place to protect individuals' privacy and due
process rights.
To answer these questions, in June 2001, EPIC filed a series of
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)6 seeking
access to government records regarding companies that sell
personal information to the government. Almost three years and a
lawsuit later, EPIC has obtained over 1,500 pages of material from
nine agencies about ChoicePoint and other CDBs. In this article,
3 See discussion infra Part III.B.
4 PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION (1977),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppscl977report/cl.htm. [hereinafter PERSONAL
PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY].
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a civil remedy for citizens whose civil rights
have been violated by government actors).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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findings are presented from the requests, and concerns are raised
regarding law enforcement access to personal information. The
conclusion sets forth a framework of privacy protections to
address risks to due process and the Fourth Amendment posed by
companies like ChoicePoint. Based on the findings, the Privacy
Act of 1974 should be extended to CDBs, as they regularly serve
as private escrows for information that the government could not
otherwise collect legally. Furthermore, there should be broader
protections for personal information in public records, as these
sources form perhaps the greatest threat to the future of data
privacy.
Determining agency practices from FOIA documents is
difficult. There are few "smoking gun" FOIA documents. Rather,
analysis requires viewing many different documents in context to
determine agency action. Because of these limitations, documents
are interpreted conservatively, and I have indicated in the text
where there are ambiguities in the documents.
The analysis is also limited by the willingness of agencies to
provide documents. Of the agencies covered by EPIC's request,
the USMS released the largest number of unredacted documents.
The FBI, on the other hand, had the greatest number of documents
responsive to the FOIA request, but the substantial majority of this
material was either heavily redacted or withheld in full. As a
result, practices of certain agencies receive more analysis than
others.
This article begins, in Part II, with a description of the
information found in the FOIA requests. In Part III, it applies
American privacy law to the use of CDBs. It concludes, in Part
IV, with several recommendations for policymakers, including
extension of the Privacy Act to CDBs that sell information to
government and the need to reevaluate public records policy in the
United States.
II. Findings from the FOIA Requests
On June 22, 2001, EPIC filed FOIA requests with seven
agencies seeking access to records "concerning businesses that sell
individuals' personal information."7  Several agencies initially
7 The seven agencies were the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the United States Marshals
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rejected the request, arguing that EPIC needed to further specify
the topic for the search of records. In those cases, EPIC specified
that the request sought all records related to ChoicePoint,
LexisNexis, Experian, Dun & Bradstreet, and Database
Technologies Online.
In January 2002, EPIC filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia against all seven agencies for
failure to comply with the FOIA's requirements.8 That litigation is
still pending. EPIC continues to seek 5,000 pages of ChoicePoint
contracting documents held by the FBI's Criminal Investigative
Division. EPIC also seeks access to a Department of Justice
(DOJ) memorandum from the agency's Office of Professional
Responsibility. That document concerns an internal investigation
regarding unauthorized disclosure of agency information. The
issues are fully briefed and are awaiting a ruling from the court.
Since filing the requests, EPIC has received over 1,500
documents.9 The documents led to six major findings. First, the
documents show that law enforcement can quickly obtain a broad
array of personal information about individuals. Second, although
EPIC filed a broad request for documents, there was almost no
evidence of controls to prevent agency employees from misusing
the databases. It appears as though auditing employee use of the
databases is either impossible or simply not done. Third, the
database companies are extremely solicitous to the government
and actually design the databases for law enforcement use.
Fourth, ChoicePoint expanded significantly in 2000 by starting to
acquire and sell personal information of non-citizens. That
discovery has led to strong international dissent. Fifth, many of
the contracts with CDBs are sole-sourced, meaning the contracts
are not open to competitive bidding. Sixth, the FBI has a secret,
sole-source contract with ChoicePoint to develop an information
service prototype.
Service (USMS), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
8 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 02-0063 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 14, 2002). The
complaint in the case may be accessed online at http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/
profilingcomplaint.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
9 All of the documents are available online for review at EPIC's website, at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint.
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A. Scope of Information Available to Law Enforcement
"One stop mind-boggling power."'"
Federal law enforcement agencies have access to a broad array
of personal data on both citizens and non-citizens. One document
obtained from the USMS describes the agency's requirement that
CDBs "produce a comprehensive profile on an individual,
generated by only one or two queries."" This power has resulted
in considerable benefit to the agencies. 2 And the agency uses it
extensively; agency documents claim that the USMS ran 20,000
searches per month in the late 1990s.13  Actual invoices dating
from February 1999 to September 2001 show that the agency ran
between 14,000 and 40,000 searches per month. 4  A document
from the FBI's Public Source Information Program claims that the
use of CDBs has increased by 9,600% since 1992.1'
1. ChoicePoint, Inc.
ChoicePoint, Inc. is a company based in Alpharetta, Georgia,
that concentrates on selling information and data services to
insurers, businesses, government, and direct marketers. 16  Last
year alone, ChoicePoint amassed revenues of over $795,700,000.17
10 AutoTrackXP, DBT ONLINE NEWS (DBT Online, Inc., Boca Raton, FL), Oct.
1999 (document obtained from the USMS), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf [hereinafter AutoTrackXP].
I I CBD Notice for AutoTrack (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02b.pdf.
12 See FBI, The FBI's Public Source Information Program: Fact Versus Fiction
(n.d.) (document obtained from the FBI) (reporting that in the Butte and Savannah areas
alone in FY 2000, 524 arrests were made using public source information programs, and
those areas only accounted for 4% of the FBI's total searches), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf [hereinafter Fact Versus Fiction].
13 Exhibit V-1: Customer Reference (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS)
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
14 See ChoicePoint, Invoice Summaries (Feb. 28, 1999 to Sept. 30, 2001)
(documents obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02h.pdf.
15 Fact Versus Fiction, supra note 12.
16 Electronic Privacy Information Center, ChoicePoint, at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/choicepoint (last updated Feb. 14, 2004) [hereinafter ChoicePoint].
17 ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint Reports Fourth Quarter and 2003 Full Year Results
(Jan. 22, 2004), at http://www.choicepoint.net/choicepoint/news.nsf/PRFinEam?
OpenForm.
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ChoicePoint has managed to attain a large share of the CDB
market with strategic purchases of other businesses. 8 In 2000,
ChoicePoint purchased DBT Online, Inc., a successful CDB that
provides "AutotrackXP," a favored law enforcement-oriented
service. 9 In 2001, it purchased the Osborn Group, Inc., and in
2002, it purchased Vital Chek Network, Inc. and Vital Chek
Network of Canada, Inc., the largest suppliers of vital records
(birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates) in the United
States and Canada.2°
ChoicePoint owns a number of other subsidiaries in Texas,
Delaware, Kansas, Arizona, Illinois, Tennessee, and
Pennsylvania. 2' These subsidiaries include EquiSearch Services,
Inc. (asset recovery), Insurity, Inc. (insurance software), National
Data Retrieval, Inc. (public records collection), Resident Data
Financial, LLC (data collection), Resident Data, Inc. (data
collection), and The Bode Technology Group, Inc. (forensic DNA
and offender databanking).
ChoicePoint sells a wide array of information to the
government, including:
23
* Credit headers, a list of identifying information that
appears at the top of a credit report. This information
includes name, spouse's name, address, previous
address, phone number, Social Security number, and
employer;
* "Workplace Solutions Pre-Employment Screening,"
which includes financial reports, education verification,
reference verification, felony check, motor vehicle
record, SSN verification, and professional credential
verification; 24
* Asset Location Services;25
18 ChoicePoint, supra note 16.
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 ChoicePoint, Pricing Schedule C (Apr. 11, 2002) (document obtained from the
DEA), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdea7.3.02.pdf.
25 Memorandum from David A. Mader, Assistant Deputy Commissioner
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
* The ability to engage in "wild card searches," which
allows law enforcement to "obtain a comprehensive
personal profile in a matter of minutes" with only a first
name or partial address;
26
* The use of "Soundex" queries, which allow searches on
personal information based on how names sound, rather
than how they are spelled;27 and
* Information on neighbors and family members of a
suspect;
2 8
ChoicePoint's AutoTrackXP is one of the most favored CDB
products.29 It provides an interface for additional data points,
including:3"
* Linkage services, which draw graphical relationships
between suspects and other addresses, neighbors, and
Social Security Numbers;
* Public records, including Social Security Death Master
Filings, bookings and arrests, liens, judgments, and
bankruptcies;
* Licenses, including drivers, pilots, and professional
credentials;
* Lists of residents of Georgia, New York, and Ohio;31
" National, real-time phone directories and reverse look-
up services;
32
Operations, IRS, to All Executives and Managers (Feb. 28, 2001) (document obtained
from the IRS), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpirs9.10.0la.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum to All Executives and Managers].
26 Sole Source Justification for Autotrack (n.d.) (document obtained from the
USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf; Soundex
(n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf.
27 USMS, CDB Notice for AutoTrack (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02b.pdf.
28 The Discovery Detail Report (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
29 ChoicePoint, supra note 16.
30 Id,
31 ChoicePoint, Pricing Schedule D (Apr. 11, 2002) (document obtained from the
DEA), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdea7.3.02.pdf [hereinafter
Pricing Schedule D].
32 Check Out What's New, ONLINE WITH AuToTRACK (DBT Online, Inc., Boca
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* Business information, compiled nationwide from
Secretaries of State;
33
" "SmartSeach," a tool that allows broad wildcard
searches: "There may be thousands of Jane Does, but
there's probably only one Jane Doe who's between 25
and 30 and lives on the upper west side of Manhattan.
SmartSearch makes it possible to find that one";34
" U.S. Military Personnel; and
* Boat owners;
ChoicePoint also offered an "Interactive Pager Service" in
2000 to the USMS.3 5 Under the arrangement, Marshals would
receive two-way pagers that delivered ChoicePoint reports
wirelessly.36
2. LexisNexis
LexisNexis, a corporation owned by the United Kingdom-
based Reed Elsevier, offers access to numerous databases and
information retrieval services.37  Through services such as its
featured search tool, "SmartLinx," LexisNexis offers access to
Social Security Numbers, addresses, licenses, real estate holdings,
bankruptcies, liens, marital status, and other personal
information.38 It bills itself as the market leader in the United
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth and as a major publisher
in Continental Europe and Latin America.39
LexisNexis began in Dayton, Ohio as a contractor for data and
Raton, FL), Spring 1999 (document obtained from the USMS), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf.
33 Id.
34 AutoTrackXP, supra note 10.
35 ChoicePoint Interactive Pager Service Agreement (May 17, 2000) (document
obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
cpusms7.30.02d.pdf [hereinafter Interactive Pager Service Agreement].
36 Id.
37 LexisNexis, Company History, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/presscenter/
mediakit/history.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Company History].
38 LexisNexis, SmartLinx, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/smartlinx/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2004).
39 LexisNexis, Company Description, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/presscenter/
mediakit/description.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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information to the U.S. Air Force.4 ° In 1979, the company began
to offer news and business information, and in 1987, the company
purchased Michie, which, at the time, was the sole provider of
statutes for thirty-five U.S. states and territories." In 1997,
LexisNexis debuted the first web-based service for U.S. legal
professionals.42 In 2003, LexisNexis merged with Canada's
Quicklaw, Inc. to form LexisNexis Canada.43
Reed Elsevier additionally acquired the legal publishing
Butterworths Group in 1970, which had operations in India,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 4 It acquired
Martindale-Hubbell, publisher of the renowned law directory, in
1990.41 Since 1998, Reed Elsevier has acquired U.S. legal
publisher Matthew Bender and leading citator Shepard's
Company.46
LexisNexis provides services to the USMS, including the
"location of witnesses, suspects, informants, criminals, parolees in
criminal investigations, location of witnesses, parties in civil
actions." '47 LexisNexis' Person Tracker Plus Social Security
Number is a private library "designed to meet the needs of law
enforcement." '48 It provides information probably derived from
credit headers, including the name, social security number, current
address, two prior addresses, aliases, birth date, and telephone
number on an individual.49 The company also provides the P-
FIND white pages directory; information on pilots, military
personnel, and professional licenses; driver's licenses for Florida,
Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin; and access to the Social
40 Company History, supra note 37.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 LexisNexis, Exhibit B: Lexis-Nexis Select Limited Distribution Authorized Use
List (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
48 LexisNexis, Fax Bulletin (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS), available
at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
49 Id.
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Security death master file.5 °
3. Dun & Bradstreet
Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) is a provider of credit, marketing,
purchasing information, and commercial receivables, with offices
in over forty countries.5 Last year alone, D&B amassed revenues
of over $1.38 billion globally.52
D&B was founded as the Mercantile Agency in New York
City in 1841, as the world's first business information provider. 3
The current D&B Corporation was formed upon the separation of
Moody's Corporation on September 30, 2000."4 At the end of last
year, D&B had over sixty subsidiaries worldwide.55
D&B is growing rapidly. For example, during 2002, the
Global D&B database grew by over 10 million records, to cover a
total of 80 million businesses; over 40,000 new family tree
members were added to the database, bringing the total number of
globally linked businesses to 7.6 million. 6 Nearly 372,000 new
businesses from the Asia Pacific region were added to the D&B
database.57 In addition, approximately 390,000 new businesses
from the Latin America region were added to the D&B database. 8
Finally, the U.S. Marketing file increased by over 3 million
records, to cover nearly 18 million businesses.5 9
Companies highly value D&B assessments of their businesses.
50 Id. The Social Security death master file is a list of deceased person's Social
Security numbers. Id.
51 See generally, Dun & Bradstreet, http://www.dnb.com (last visited Mar. 27,
2004) (providing a list of country offices and websites).
52 Dun & Bradstreet, D&B Announces 2003 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Results
(Feb. 2, 2004), at http://www.dnb.com/US/about/index.html.
53 Dun & Bradstreet, The History of D&B, at http://www.dnb.com/us/about/
companystory/dnbhistory.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter The History of
D&B].
54 Id.
55 Dun & Bradstreet, Form l0-Kfor the Period December 31, 2003 (Mar. 5, 2004),
at http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/nys/dnb/reports/2003_ OK.pdf.
56 Dun & Bradstreet, Facts & Figures, at http://www.dnb.com/us/about/
dbdatabase/dnbstatistics.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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It is unclear, however, if the executives at the companies
understand that D&B eagerly sells reports not only to investors,
but also to the government. In marketing materials obtained from
the government, the company writes that D&B:
[M]aintains the largest commercial databases of business
information in the world, including information on the largest
Fortune 500 companies [unreadable] mom & pops who are
doing business from their home. In fact, 85% of our records
have less than 20 employees, and 97% of these records contain
ownership details. 60
The company's marketing materials list four full pages of data
elements available to the government, including assets, the age of
the executives, credit information, socio-economic indicators, and
the telecommunications capability of the company.61
4. Experian, Inc.
Experian, Inc., a CDB based in Nottingham, United Kingdom
and Costa Mesa, California, is a subsidiary of GUS pic, a U.K.-
based holding company that includes retail, property investment,
finance, and information services businesses. 62 Experian offers a
wide range of information and database services, including the
sale of credit reports and credit headers. 63  The information
included in such credit reports includes the availability of credit,
bankruptcy information, newly opened trades, the presence of a
mortgage, recent credit inquiries, delinquencies, judgments, and
liens.6
Experian also runs an extensive direct marketing business,
60 E-mail from Jennifer Schaus, Dunn & Bradstreet, to Sharma Bahwana, Contract
Specialist, INS (Sept. 27, 2001) (document obtained from the INS), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpins3.25.02a.pdf.
61 Dun & Bradstreet, Data Elements Available from Dun & Bradstreet (Sept. 27,
2001) (document obtained from the INS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpins3.25.02a.pdf.
62 Experian, About Experian (2004), at http://www.experian.com/about.html.
63 See Experian, Company Profile (2004), at http://www.experian.com/corporate/
index.html [hereinafter Company Profile].
64 See Experian, Sample Credit Report (2004), at http://www.experian.com/
consumer onlineproducts/creditmanager.html#. The company delivered more than
2.7 million credit scores in 2003. Company Profile, supra note 63. Currently, more than
1.6 million members belong to its credit monitoring service. Id.
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selling consumer financial, educational, racial, and family
information. 65 Experian maintains records on approximately 215
million U.S. consumers 66 and more than 15 million U.S.
businesses. 67  The company's medical databases include lists of
individuals suffering from incontinence, prostate problems, and
clinical depression.68
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses Experian to obtain
credit reports.69
B. Lack of Protections Against Insider Abuse
"[S]ed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?,,70
Juvenal made this statement to ridicule Roman men who
attempted to control the sexual fidelity of their wives by providing
them with male guards.7 Juvenal's mocking statement has gained
gravitas over the centuries, and it is now a serious question posed
to those trusted with power: How does one supervise the
authorities and ensure that government power is exercised with
responsibility?
Supervising the authorities is a difficult task because literally
tens of thousands of federal law enforcement agents have access to
CDBs. 72 A memorandum from the IRS shows that after the
agency purchased services from ChoicePoint and Experian, it
initially issued usernames and passwords to over 12,000
65 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Barriers to the Constitutional Right to Privacy: Big
Business Is Keeping an Eye On You, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2004, at A23, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/01/29/EDGH14JBAN1.
DTL (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
66 Experian, INSOURCE (2004), at http://www.experian.com/products/insource
.html.
67 Experian, Choose the Best Prospect Lists (2004), at http://www.experian.com/
directmarketing/acquire customers/prospect lists.html.
68 Hoofnagle, supra note 65.
69 Memorandum to All Executives and Managers, supra note 25.
70 JUVENAL, SATIRE VI: JUVENAL AND PERSIUS, 11. 346-7 (G. G. Ramsay trans., G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1918) (translated, "[B]ut who is to guard the guards themselves?").
71 Id. ("I hear all this time the advice of my old friends - 'Put on a lock and keep
your wife indoors.' Yes, but who will ward the warders? The wife arranges accordingly
and begins with them.").
72 See Memorandum to All Executives and Managers, supra note 25.
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employees.73 The same document indicated that "[a]dditional end
user names will be transmitted to ChoicePoint in the future.,
74
With the personal information of so many people at the fingertips
of thousands of government agents, agencies need to establish
sound measures to ensure responsibility.
One way to watch the watchers is to regularly audit access to
CDB files. By doing so, a supervising officer can track personal
use or other misuse of CDBs. Simple procedures, such as
requiring an officer to keep an access log and to record the
purpose for which searches are performed, can help promote a
culture of accountability with personal information. However,
these common sense precautions do not appear to have been
implemented at any agency.75
Since the agency's query records are held at the CDB,
normally the CDB could audit or track suspicious behavior. But
for good reasons, auditing at the CDB is technically impossible.
The agencies have arranged for "cloaked" access. This type of
access "prevents anybody inside or outside the Company from
tracking records a law enforcement user is researching. 76
Without cloaked access, employees of the CDB could monitor law
enforcement investigations and possibly tip off suspects.
Requirements for cloaking may have been adopted after it came to
light that Edward Asher, the founder of DBT Online (who later
founded Seisint, the principal company behind the Multistate Anti-
Terrorism Information Exchange, or "MATRIX"), was suspected
of having ties to drug smugglers.77 News of this impropriety
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See IRS, Statement of Work: Section C (n.d.) (document obtained from the IRS),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpirs9.10.01a.pdf. The IRS has
session auditing, enabling the agent to recall all searches during one session use. Session
auditing is inadequate to deter misuse of the CDB and the agency was emphatic in
specifying that audits should be available only for one session. See id
76 DBT's AutoTrackXP.com Secure, Anti-Fraud Web Site Listed on GSA Award
Schedule, DBT ONLINE NEWS (DBT Online, Inc., Boca Raton, FL), July 8, 1999
(document obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf [hereinafter DBT's AutoTrackXP.com Secure, Anti-
Fraud Web Site Listed].
77 Associated Press, DEA, FBI Suspend Online Contracts With Database Company
(July 13, 1999) (document obtained from the Office of National Drug Control Policy),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpondcp2.5.02.pdf.
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caused the DEA to suspend access to the company's main law
enforcement product, AutoTrack.78
If access to the CDB is cloaked, auditing would have to occur
at the government agency. But no document obtained from the
government discusses auditing of law enforcement access as a
regular policy to ensure honesty. In fact, the documents suggest
that no auditing to prevent employee misuse occurs at all. This
inference comes from a heavily redacted memorandum, where the
DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility reviewed "Misconduct
Allegations [redacted] Concerning Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information., 79 At one point in the investigation, a government
employee uses ChoicePoint to search for personal information:
"According to [redacted] conducted a 'Choicepoint data search'
and discovered recent credit activity [redacted] was alive
[redacted]."8 In the "Discussion" section of the same memo, the
text of a footnote suggests that auditing is not required and does
not occur:
[redacted] requested a review [redacted] to determine the
existence of any record of a Choicepoint database search. FBI
[redacted] advised DOJ OPR that "no such record was found,"
but further stated that no such record is required to be
maintained. FBI [redacted] also asked Choicepoint to conduct a
review of its internal records to determine whether [redacted]
performed a credit check of [redacted]. A representative of
Choicepoint advised the FBI that the security parameters of its
database do not permit Choicepoint to make such an inquiry.81
The latter portion of that paragraph refers to the "cloaking"
that prevents ChoicePoint from viewing government queries of the
78 See Memorandum from Joseph Peters, National Director, High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, Bureau of State and Local Affairs, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, to All HIDTA Directors (Jun. 17, 1999) (document
obtained from the Office of National Drug Control Policy), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpondcp2.5.02.pdf.
79 Memorandum from H. Marshall Jarrett, Counsel, DOJ, to Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Director, Executive Officer for United States Attorneys (Jun. 17, 2002) (document
obtained from the DOJ), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdoj
12.13.02.pdf.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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database.82 It is reasonable to conclude that the first portion refers
to the government's attempt to determine employee use of the
database, and it appears that the government did not have, nor did
it require, an audit trail.83
Other agency documents discuss information security, but in
most cases, the measures are in place to protect the agency, rather
than the privacy of individuals. For instance, one document from
the USMS specifies that there are access restrictions for use of
CDBs: "We must ensure that these [access lines to the database]
are only being used for authorized purposes."84 But it becomes
clear that the agency is primarily concerned about Marshals
running searches for colleagues in other agencies, a technical
violation of the contract with the CDB: "Any unauthorized
purpose, such as running queries for another law enforcement
agency, may prevent someone in another district from running
queries for a USMS investigation."85
In crafting access restrictions, the USMS is also concerned
about the traffic load on the computers. Too many searches could
exclude other branches or offices from running searches: "We also
ask that queries be run as quickly as possible during peak hours
and be mindful of other users nationwide. The extensive
'browsing' type searches should be saved for early or late hours in
the workday, or after hours."86
Another agency memorandum does warn that use of CDBs for
"non-law enforcement purposes is prohibited., 87  But merely
prohibiting the behavior is unlikely to deter individuals from
misusing the CDBs. If the agency does not audit, individuals can
misuse the CDB and face only a small risk of detection.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 Memorandum from Robert J. Finan II, Assistant Director, Investigative Services
Division, USMS, to All United States Marshals, All Chief Deputy United States
Marshals, and All Warrant Supervisors (Feb. 19, 1999) (document obtained from the
USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Memorandum from Robert J. Finan II, Assistant Director, Investigative Services
Division, USMS, to All United States Marshals, All Chief Deputy United States
Marshals, and All Warrant Supervisors (Jan. 28, 1999) (document obtained from the
USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
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C. Data is Tailored to Government
The sale of personal information goes far beyond simply
making the data available to government. ChoicePoint and others
tailor their data for law enforcement agencies. A sales pitch from
DBT Online, a company now owned by ChoicePoint, reads in
part: "AutoTrack Plus was designed with law enforcement in
mind. DBT created its services with the help of law enforcement
and continues to maintain sworn law enforcement officers on
,,88site. Indeed, in a 1998 letter to the USMS, a DBT Vice
President congratulates the agency for buying a subscription to
AutoTrack Plus:
During my tenure as Special Agent of the DEA's Florida
Division I became aware of AutoTrack PLUS as an exciting,
new and truly innovative investigative resource .... I selected
AutoTrack PLUS as the database resource for all of the DEA's
offices in Florida. The system quickly became an integral part
of our investigative process.
And after 26 years with the DEA, I retired and joined Database
Technologies, Inc. as a Vice President. My goal here is to
introduce AutoTrack PLUS to every member of the law
enforcement community throughout our nation .... To that end,
every law enforcement agency is extended an automatic 33%
89discount on our service.
DBT even circulated a special newsletter for law enforcement
subscribers.9"
ChoicePoint was highly rated by its agency clients. In a
review of ChoicePoint's services performed by a USMS
employee, the company earned a perfect score and a strong written
accolade: "ChoicePoint is very responsive to the Marshals
Services and has made enhancements to their public information
database (CDB Infotek) to meet our needs." 91
88 Letter from Database Technologies, Inc. to Intelligence Analyst, USMS (Oct. 9,
1997) (document obtained from the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02a.pdf.
89 Letter from James Milford, Vice President, Database Technologies, Inc., to the
USMS (May 29, 1998) (document obtained from the USMS) (emphasis in original),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf.
90 Id.
91 USMS, Past Performance Work Sheet (Nov. 20, 2000) (document obtained from
the USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02a.pdf.
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D. The International Dimension
In 2000, ChoicePoint began collecting international data.9 2 In
marketing materials 93  provided to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the company emphasized that the
information was legally obtained from official sources in
compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).94 The
INS has obtained cloaked access to ChoicePoint databases for the
agency's "Quick Response Teams" and "Headquarters
Investigation Division."95 In 2001, the agency ran approximately
20,000 "domestic" searches monthly, and 3,000 international
searches. 96 Eighty to ninety percent of the international searches
were on Mexican citizens. 97
INS authorities chose ChoicePoint as their main CDB because
it had a broad array of personal information on non-citizens.
ChoicePoint is the only vendor capable of providing online access
to the following data sets: complete listings of all Mexican,
Colombian, and Argentine Citizens; inclusion of unlisted numbers
in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina; Mexican vehicle and driver
license data; Colombian company data; and Brazilian business
people.98
A ChoicePoint marketing paper describes the source of the
information available more fully. It appears as though
ChoicePoint is selling information from Mexico's voter
registration rolls, a practice that is illegal in most American
92 ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint International Data Access Statement of Work: U.S.
INS (Sept. 12, 2001) (document obtained from the INS), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpins3.25.02b.pdf [hereinafter ChoicePoint
International Data Access Statement of Work].
93 Id.
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78m(b), 78ff (2000).
95 Memorandum of the INS (n.d.) (document obtained from the INS), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpins3.25.02a.pdf.
96 INS, Independent Government Cost Estimate for On-Line International Public
Access (n.d.) (document obtained from the INS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpins3.25.02a.pdf; INS, ChoicePoint (n.d.) (document obtained from the
INS) available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpins3.25.02a.pdf [hereinafter
Choicepoint (INS)].
97 Choicepoint (INS), supra note 96.
98 Id.
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states.99 A Mexico citizen registry database has a nationwide
listing of "all Mexican citizens registered to vote as of the 2000
national election .... Data includes full name(s), legal addresses,
[date of birth], Place of Birth, Gender and identification
information."'' °
For Columbia, ChoicePoint planned to offer a national registry
file of all adults, "including date and place of birth, gender,
parentage, physical description, marital status, registration date,
registration and passport number, and registered profession."' 0
Similar databases exist for Argentina and Costa Rica.' °
In April 2002, EPIC obtained and posted documents showing
this extensive information sale by ChoicePoint. On April 14,
2003, Jim Krane of the Associated Press wrote an article about the
sale of this information that ran in newspapers internationally.0 3
Public reaction to this news was intense. ChoicePoint quickly
issued statements to sooth the situation, claiming that the data was
legally acquired from third-party vendors. 0 4 But whether the data
was obtained legally did not matter to the individuals whose
information was sold.'0 5 The sale was morally objectionable to
them, and threatened the integrity of their elections process and
99 Generally, American state laws protect personal information in voting registers,
and only allow candidates to use the information for campaigning. See, for instance,
Maryland's code on the subject: "Any individual who knowingly allows a registration
list under the individual's control to be used for commercial solicitation or any other
purpose not related to the electoral process is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
punished under the provisions of Title 16 of this article." MD. CODE ANN., ELECT. § 3-
507(c) (2000).
too ChoicePoint International Data Access Statement of Work, supra note 92.
101 Id.
102 Id
103 See Jim Krane, U.S. Buys Latin Americans' Personal Data, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
14, 2003, at A10, available at http://www.seattletimes.com (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
104 Ricardo Chavira, Firm: Mexican Voters' Data Illegally Obtained: Atlanta
Company Says It Violated No Law, Blames Vendor, Will Purge Files, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 17, 2003, at 21, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dallas/world/stories/051703dnintvote.edb9.html.
105 Argentinian privacy expert Pablo A. Palazzi tracked the ChoicePoint sale
reaction closely. See Pablo A. Palazzi, Data Protection Materials in Latin American
Countries (June 30, 2003), available at http://www.ulpiano.com/DataProtection-LA-
links.htm.
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the very sovereignty of their countries.' °6 Legal experts from the
region disagreed with ChoicePoint's assessment. One legal expert
described the sale as "espionage."' 7 Tec de Monterrey University
Professor Julio Tellez argued that the information on Mexicans
could only be used for elections, and its use for impermissible
purposes subjected ChoicePoint and the U.S. government to
suit.1°8
Within two days, the Presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica
announced investigations into the sale, and Mexican officials
hinted that the country would retaliate against the United States at
an upcoming United Nations meeting." 9  Later that week,
Nicaraguan authorities raided businesses thought to have sold
information to ChoicePoint."0  Mexican authorities eventually
placed three suspects under house arrest; the charge was treason."'
The American government was monitoring these
developments. Documents obtained from the American Embassy
in San Jose show that the government was monitoring news
reports covering the information transfer." 2 On April 15, 2003,
the American Embassy in Mexico sent a confidential action cable
regarding the controversy to several agencies, including the DOJ,
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House, and
the National Security Council." 3  The message noted that the
106 Latin American Officials Demand Investigation Into Data Sales, USA TODAY,
Apr. 16, 2003 [hereinafter Investigation Into Data Sales].
107 Hugh Dellios, U.S. Data Mining Investigated; 'Information Trafficking' Riles
Latin America, CH. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2003, at 6.
108 Oliver Burkeman & Jo Tuckman, How US Paid For Secret Files on Foreign
Citizens: Latin Americans Furious in Row Over Selling Personal Data, GUARDIAN, May
5, 2003, at 4.
109 Investigation Into Data Sales, supra note 106.
110 Peralte C. Paul & Susan Ferriss, Privacy Concern Crosses Boundary; Mexican
Government Says Alpharetta-based ChoicePoint Illegally Sold Voter Data to U.S.,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 27, 2003, at 1Q.
III Associated Press, House Arrest For 3 Suspected Of Selling Mexico Voter Data
(Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ap.org (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
112 News Articles (various dates) (documents obtained from the Department of
State), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdos 11.3.03.pdf.
113 Department of State, Action Cable: Media Hammers U.S. on Alleged Purchase
of Database Information, (Apr. 15, 2003) (document obtained from the Department of
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Mexican media had covered the sale of personal information from
the federal elections institute database, and that officials had
already filed a complaint against unnamed election officials. The
Embassy noted that "a potential firestorm may be brewing""' 4 and
that ChoicePoint's spokesperson had confirmed that American
government "agencies regularly use ChoicePoint information for
fighting drug trafficking and terrorism.""' 5  The cable closes,
"Most importantly, embassy requests guidance for press
inquires."' 16
The embassies discussed generating public relations materials
to shape the debate. In an e-mail from the American Embassy in
Managua, a public relations officer asked colleagues to find
"articles or writers on this issue."' 7 The public relations officer
continued:
The kind of article I am thinking of would outline the debate
within the U.S. about the extent of government access to
electronic info and efforts to pass laws that restrict that
access .... The article shouldn't be one-sided and alarmist, but
rather point to the difficult challenge of striking a balance, and
to make clear that this is a dynamic process. If a good article
like this exists, we might try and get rights. If the article doesn't
exist, we might think about commissioning a writer." 8
Eventually, the news of the sale sparked calls for privacy
reform in Central and Latin America. The President of Costa Rica
later proposed legislation that would limit the sale of databases
containing personal information. "' In addition, five other
countries reconsidered passing comprehensive database privacy
State), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdos 12.3.03.pdf.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 E-mail from William Peters to Reference at IIP (Apr. 28, 2003) (document
obtained from the Department of State), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpdos2.2.04.pdf.
1i Id.
119 Costa Rica Pres to Propose Limits on Sale of Databases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2003, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BTCO_20030805_009404,00.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
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legislation. 120
It is worth asking why the reaction to ChoicePoint activities
was so intense in other countries, while in the United States, less
critical attention has been directed at these practices. It could be
because Americans have already been inundated with the public
relations strategies that the American Embassies discussed. It
could be because Americans trust domestic companies and law
enforcement; perhaps if Canada or some other country collected
troves of information on Americans, the public would become
upset.
In any case, ChoicePoint seems to be expanding its access to
personal information of non-citizens: "ChoicePoint... is actively
seeking to add data from other countries in Latin America, Asia,
and Europe. '  The company will face serious challenges in
doing so, especially if other nations implement comprehensive
data protection acts to prevent uncontrolled access and aggregation
of personal information.
E. Sole-Source Contracts
Many of the contracts with ChoicePoint are "sole-sourced,"
that is, they are not open to competitive bidding. Since sole-
source bidding may be unfair or wasteful, agencies must justify
their decisions to avoid the competitive bidding process.
The agencies have heavily redacted documents that justify
sole-sourcing. For instance, in seeking a sole-sourced contract for
AutoTrackXP, all justifications for the lack of a competitive
bidding process were fully withheld. 122  The IRS withheld the
"Statement of Need," "Trade-offs," "Risks," and even the
"Product Descriptions."' 23 A July 1999 press release from DBT
Online announced that AutoTrackXP is available on the General
120 ChoicePoint Said to Stop Selling Data on Mexicans to US, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3 1,
2003, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT CO 20030831_000609,00.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
121 ChoicePoint International Data Access Statement of Work, supra note 92.
122 Dep't of the Treasury, Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition
(Apr. 9, 2002) (document obtained from the Dep't of the Treasury), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpatf4.9.02a.pdf.
123 Id.
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Services Administration award schedule. 2 4 This allows an agency
to purchase the service automatically, without entering into
competitive bidding.
Several federal agencies buy access to ChoicePoint data
through the DOJ's Justice Management Division. 25  The DOJ
maintains a "Telecommunications Services Staff' that facilitates
the data sale. This arrangement allows smaller agencies to more
quickly gain access to CDB services at a lower cost and without
having to issue solicitations for contracts.
F. The FBI's Criminal Investigative Division Has a Secret,
Sole-Sourced Contract with ChoicePoint
The FBI released documents that refer to a secret, classified
contract between the agency's Criminal Investigative Division and
ChoicePoint.'26  The documents contain a discussion of the
agency's justification for awarding a sole-source contract to
ChoicePoint. The agency reasons that such an arrangement is
necessary because revealing the topic of the contract to other
companies would endanger national security. 127  Specifically, it
would expose the Criminal Investigative Division and National
Security Division operations to risk.'28 After learning of the
release of these documents, the DOJ urgently requested the
documents back from EPIC and another requester. 29  The
Department recently asked a court to fully exclude the classified
contract from EPIC's FOIA request. 30
124 DBT's AutoTrackXP.com Secure, Anti-Fraud Web Site, supra note 76.
125 See Dep't of the Treasury, Reimbursable Agreement (July 28, 2000) (document
obtained from the Dep't of the Treasury), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/cpatf4.9.02a.pdf.
126 The FOIA has a provision that allows the government not to reveal the presence
of classified documents that are secret. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(3) (2000). When individuals
request such material, the agency may respond that it has no responsive records. See id.
127 See Memorandum from the Criminal Investigative Division, FBI, to the Finance
Division, FBI (Apr. 4, 2000) (document obtained from the FBI), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbil.31.02a.pdf.
128 FBI, Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition (n.d.) (document
Obtained from the FBI), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
cpfbil.31.02b.pdf.
129 Letter from Jennifer Paisner, Trial Attorney, DOJ, to Chris Hoofnagle, Deputy
Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center (Apr. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
130 See Defendant's Motion to Exclude Classified Documents from Plaintiff's FOIA
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The documents are heavily redacted, and the reader is invited
to infer their meaning. One contract schedule describes the
following service: "The Criminal Investigative Division (CID)
[redacted] has a requirement to conduct a feasibility study for a
prototype methodology to meet the requirements of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI), [redacted] Program."'' The term
for this prototype methodology is nine months.
Both parties wished to keep the prototype under wraps. The
contract has severe terms, specifying that if the agency releases
proprietary information, it will constitute a material breach of the
contract."3 Proprietary information was to be released to the FBI
only on a need-to-know basis. Under one draft of the contract, if
ChoicePoint released FBI law enforcement information, it also
would constitute a material breach. One agency employee
working on the contract wrote after this provision: "{CAN WE
GET SOME LIFE OR DEATH LANGUAGE FOR HERE?}.' 33
ChoicePoint employees with access to the FBI facility housing the
prototype had to have "secret" level security clearances.'34
III. Role of Privacy Law is Unclear
American privacy law tends to be sectoral and context based.
Unlike other nations, the United States lacks a comprehensive
privacy law to protect data. Information is protected based on the
sector of the economy regulated and sometimes the context in
which the information is collected. For instance, medical
information communicated to a health provider is protected by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
Request, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 02-0063 (D.D.C. 2002) (filed Dec. 3 1,
2003).
131 FBI, Schedule (Nov. 27, 2000) (document obtained from the FBI), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbi 1.31.02a.pdf
132 FBI, Non Disclosure Agreement: Rough Draft (July 7, 2000) (document
obtained from the FBI), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
cpfbil.31.02c.pdf.
133 Id.
134 id. (providing at paragraph H.7(5)(a), Secret Security Clearances, that "[a]ll
Owners, officers, directors, executive personnel, job superintendents, and security
officers of the Contractor and selected subcontractors with access to the FBI Facility or
to the contract documents shall possess ... [c]learances at the "SECRET" level").
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(HIPPA)."' However, when a consumer completes a product
warranty card that requests details about ailments, that information
can be freely sold to anyone for any purpose. Similarly, cable
companies face strict rules limiting the use of data on viewers'
behaviors, but the law does not extend to intermediate devices,
such as a Tivo personal video recorder. Tivo, Inc. can sell the
same information that the cable company cannot. Privacy law in
the United States is riddled with similar deficits in protection.
A 2001 FBI memorandum analyzed the application of privacy
law to CDBs. The agency's Office of General Counsel considered
whether ChoicePoint could be used for foreign intelligence and
counterterrorism purposes."' Much of the analysis is redacted, but
the agency concludes that the use of ChoicePoint is consistent with
privacy law and DOJ regulations:
In summary, it is our opinion that, as stated in the DOJ Online
Guidelines, "obtaining information from online facilities
configured for public access is a minimally intrusive law
enforcement activity." In this regard, individuals "do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information that
has been made publicly available . . . ." Finally, the Attorney
General Guidelines do not preclude the use of an Internet
resource, such as ChoicePoint, to obtain publicly available
identifying data concerning either known or unknown
persons. 137
In a routing slip that appears to accompany this memorandum, an
FBI employee writes: "you may use ChoicePoint to your heart's
content."'13
8
James Dempsey and Lara Flint argued in 2003 that "[a]n
analysis of existing law shows that there are, in fact, few legal
constraints on government access to commercial databases ....
[L]aws on specific categories of commercial data are riddled with
135 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
136 Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel, National Security Law Unit,
FBI, to National Security, FBI (Sept. 17, 2001) (document obtained from the FBI),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum
from Office of the General Counsel].
137 Id. (emphasis in original).
138 FBI, Office of the General Counsel, National Security Law Unit, Routing Slip
(Sept. 16, 2001) (document obtained from the FBI), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbic.pdf.
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exceptions for law enforcement or intelligence uses.' 1 9
While it is true that Congress and the courts have allowed the
government broad access to personal information held by
commercial organizations, privacy protections apply in some
cases. It is apparent at least to the CDBs that privacy laws apply
to some extent. Their contracts with agencies are peppered with
requirements to comply with several privacy laws. CDBs view
certain federal privacy laws as limiting their activities, but the
scope of those limits is unclear. These limits are explored in the
section below. The best prospect for meaningful privacy
protection flows from the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 4 ° Other acts
have been interpreted narrowly, or were written to regulate
specific sectors of the economy that do not reach CDBs.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. 4' It has been up to courts to define the bounds of
"unreasonable" and "search." In Katz v. United States, the
Supreme Court adopted the modern test, one where the
government is prohibited from intruding into zones where
individuals enjoy a "reasonable expectation of privacy."'42 Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion set forth two requirements for a
constitutionally-recognized zone of privacy: (1) it must be a place
that a person subjectively believes to be private; and (2) society
must be prepared to recognize the zone as private."'
The Supreme Court decided in United States v. Miller that
individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information provided to others.' 44 As a result, law enforcement
agencies do not need a warrant or subpoena to obtain information
from a large array of sources that hold personal data. Dempsey
139 JAMES DEMPSEY & LARA FLINT, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., PRIVACY'S
GAP: THE LARGELY NON-EXISTENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT MINING OF
COMMERCIAL DATA 1 (2003), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/
030528cdt.pdf.
140 15 U.S.C. §§ 168la-t (2000).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
143 Id. at 361.
144 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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and Flint discuss some categories of sensitive information that can
be acquired easily by law enforcement agencies as a result of
Miller. Such information includes travel records, store purchases
(from books to groceries), automated toll records, building access
records, real estate information, utility bills, club memberships,
and magazine subscriptions.
45
News reports following the September 11, 2001 attacks
indicated that law enforcement agencies increased requests to
private parties for communications information. 146 In particular,
internet service providers (ISPs) were targeted by these requests.
The Seattle Times quoted Al Gidari of Perkins Cole describing
this increase: "What we've seen after Sept. 11 - at least in the
United States - is about a fivefold increase in the number of
subpoenas requested of service providers, and frankly... just
requests for information.','
47
Furthermore, some private businesses have crafted "law
enforcement-friendly" policies that exploit the Miller case in order
to provide data to government. In a closed-door conference in
February 2003, eBay, the world's largest Internet auction site,
revealed that it had crafted its privacy policy to maximize
efficiency in responding to law enforcement requests for personal
data. "'48 eBay described in detail how the company "is willing to
hand over everything it knows about visitors to its web site that
might be of interest to an investigator.', 49 eBay's Joseph Sullivan,
director of the company's Law Enforcement and Compliance
Department, specified that law enforcement only need to ask for
the information they wish to obtain: "There's no need for a court
order."' 5 ° The article specifies that law enforcement requests for
t45 DEMPSEY & FLINT, supra note 139, at 3.
146 See Phil Brennan, National Security Becomes National Snoopery,
NEWSMAX.COM (Apr. 24, 2002), at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/2002/
4/23/162051.shtml; Sarah Lai Stirland, Reluctant Snoops: For Internet Services, War
Against Terror Means Flood of Subpoenas, SEATTLETIMES.COM (Sept. 30, 2002), at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
147 Brennan, supra note 146.
148 Yuval Dror, Big Brother Is Watching You - and Documenting,
HAARETZDAILY.COM (Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
149 Id.
15o Id.
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data are sometimes delivered by e-mail or fax.
The shortsighted Miller decision does not take into account the
reality that individuals need to give their information to third
parties in order to participate in society. It is unfair to cede all
individuals' rights to a company that can simply hand over
personal information to law enforcement. Congress acted swiftly
to reverse the Miller decision with respect to financial records,151
and several state supreme courts have rejected the Miller
approach.'52
The current conception of protections under the Fourth
Amendment provides individuals with little protection against
CDBs.
B. The Privacy Act
Some contracting documents55 require ChoicePoint to fully
comply with the Privacy Act.'54 The Privacy Act of 1974 requires
government agencies to apply a full set of "Fair Information
Practices" to systems of records that contain personal
information.' Principally, the Act prohibits amassing personal
information unless the agency has a proper purpose for doing so.
Once collected, personal information is subject to a series of
rights. The government must give notice of all the databases it
maintains. It must provide access and correction rights. It must
limit collection to only the information necessary to fulfill a
specified government function. Finally, data must be destroyed
after a certain period of time.
151 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000). A
detailed description of the Act is available at http://epic.org/privacy/rfpa/.
152 Most recently, a New Jersey Appellate Court rejected Miller, and now the
government in that state must obtain a search warrant to obtain access to financial
records. See State v. McAllister, 840 A.2d 967, 976, 978 (N.J. App. Dv. 2004).
153 DOJ, Blanket Purchase Agreement for Access to Public Databases (n.d.)
(document obtained from the DOJ), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
cpdoj8.14.02.pdf.
154 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1994)). A detailed description of the Act is available at http://epic.org/privacy/1974act.
See also Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing a discussion
of the Privacy Act).
155 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
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The Act only applies to the federal government and to private
companies that are administering a system of records for the
government. 156  When the information originates from the
government and is transferred to a private company, Privacy Act
requirements apply to the contractor. For instance, in a contract
between ChoicePoint and the USMS, when the agency transfers
fugitive data to the company, Privacy Act obligations accompany
the data.'57 However, a database of information that originates at a
CDB would not trigger the requirements of the Privacy Act. In
fact, credit reporting agencies are specifically exempted from
being considered a federal contractor for systems of records. 58
This limitation to the Privacy Act is critical-it allows CDBs
to amass huge databases that the government is legally prohibited
from creating. Then, when the government needs the information,
it can request it from the CDB. At that point, the personal
information would be subject to the Privacy Act, but law
enforcement and intelligence agencies have special exemptions
under the Act that limit access, accuracy, and correction rights. 5 9
C. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)161 was the first federal
law to regulate private-sector use and disclosure of personal
information. It offers the greatest opportunities for protection of
data held by CDBs. The law regulates the collection, maintenance,
and dissemination of "credit reports." The law is opt-in; that is,
individuals must consent to release of their credit reports unless
the transfer of data is authorized under a specific section of the
Act.1
6 1
Under the law, police have a number of avenues to access
credit reports. Full credit reports can be accessed by court order,
by grand jury subpoena, or by request of a child support
156 Id. § 552a(m).
157 USMS, Modification: MOO1 (n.d.) (document obtained from the USMS),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf.
158 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m)(2).
159 Id. § 552a(k).
160 15 U.S.C. § 168la-t (2000). A detailed description of the Act is available at
http://epic.org/privacy/fcra/.
161 Id. § 1681b (2000).
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enforcement agency. 62  Credit information can be obtained
through three other FCRA provisions. The Act allows the FBI
access to individuals' account information and identifying
information for counterintelligence purposes upon written
request. 163 A provision added by the USA PATRIOT Act 164 allows
any government agency with a counterintelligence purpose to
obtain the full credit file upon written certification that it is
necessary for either an investigation or intelligence analysis.
65
Another section allows any government agency to obtain credit
headers, identifying information from a credit report, upon
request. 166
The FBI has interpreted the FCRA artfully in order to evade all
of the requirements and procedures of the Act. The FCRA has a
poorly drafted definition of "consumer report" that has allowed
some to narrow the Act's coverage in a way that contradicts
Congress' intent. The Act conditions the definition of "credit
report" on how the information is used. That is, a "credit report"
is any communication bearing on a consumer's character or
general reputation, which is used for credit evaluation,
employment screening, insurance underwriting, or licensing. 6
7
Some have used this awkward construction to limit the scope of
the Act, resulting in absurd, unintended consequences. One could
argue, for instance, that a criminal who obtains credit information
from a bureau, but uses it for fraud, has not triggered the Act,
because fraud is not one of the enumerated uses of a "credit
report."
The FBI uses similar reasoning to evade protections of the
FCRA: "In this instance, none of the information which the FBI
would seek to review has been collected by ChoicePoint for any of
the [FCRA] purposes.' ' 168  The agency further concludes that
ChoicePoint is not a credit reporting agency: "Because
ChoicePoint does not collect 'public record information' for any
162 Id. § 1681b(a).
163 Id. § 1681u.
164 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
165 Id. § 1681v (Supp. 2001).
166 Id. § 1681f.
167 Id. § 168 1 a(d) (emphasis added).
168 Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel, supra note 136.
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of the highlighted purposes, ChoicePoint is not acting as a
'consumer reporting agency' for the purposes of the FCRA and the
collected information therefore does not constitute a 'consumer
report.' 1 6
9
Both of these conclusions are based on a strained reading of
the Act which contravenes the intent of Congress. The provisions
governing law enforcement access make it clear that Congress
intended procedural safeguards against disclosure of credit
information, regardless of its intended use.
Two courts have rejected the reasoning underlying the FBI's
logic, although no court has ruled directly on the issue of whether
law enforcement access to CDBs triggers the FCRA. As Dempsey
and Flint note in their review of federal privacy law and access to
commercial information, some courts have ruled that when
information is collected for credit reporting purposes, it remains a
credit report, despite the fact that it may be employed for non-
FCRA purposes. 70
There are FCRA-style contract requirements in an agreement
to provide the USMS with interactive pagers that transmit
ChoicePoint information wirelessly."7 l The agreement places
ChoicePoint under a burden to assure "maximum possible
accuracy" of information reported to the agency, and requires the
company to "reinvestigate" any information disputed by the
agency. Both of these terms are taken from the FCRA.
D. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Some agency documents' 72 discuss compliance with the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). 173 That law allows individuals
to opt-out of a limited amount of information sharing among
financial services companies, including credit reporting
169 Id.
170 DEMPSEY & FLINT, supra note 139, at 6 n. 16.
171 Interactive Pager Service Agreement, supra note 35.
172 DOJ, Reimbursement Agreement Between Agencies (Apr. 8, 2002) (document
obtained from the DEA), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpdea
7.3.02.pdf [hereinafter Reimbursement Agreement Between Agencies].
173 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12,
15, 16, 18 U.S.C.). A detailed description of the Act is available at http://epic.org/
privacy/glba/.
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agencies.174 The Act specifically allows disclosure of personal
information to law enforcement agencies.'75 It also preserves law
enforcement access to financial records under the Right to
Financial Privacy Act.' 76 Furthermore, the GLBA contains a
savings clause that preserves the ability of law enforcement to
obtain personal information under the standards of the FCRA
summarized above. 1
77
The GLBA requires financial services institutions to develop
privacy and security safeguards for non-public personal
information, but law enforcement agencies are not subject to this
requirement. 178 The only prohibition that might apply to law
enforcement is a requirement that information not be passed on to
third parties or used for secondary purposes, such as direct
marketing. 179
E. Driver's Privacy Protection Act
Since 1998, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) 80 has
required state motor vehicle administrators to gain opt-in consent
before selling personal information. 8' The Act principally
provides protection by preventing release of information from the
state to CDBs.182  However, both ChoicePoint and LexisNexis
offer to sell motor vehicle administration information on residents
of Texas and Florida.'83 At least three class action suits have been
initiated against CDBs for these practices. 84
The Act only protects information at motor vehicle
174 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000).
175 Id. § 6802(e)(5).
176 Id.
177 Id. § 6806.
178 Id. §§ 6801(b), 6809.
179 Id. § 6802(c)-(d).
180 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000).
181 Id. § 2721.
182 See id.
183 Pricing Schedule D, supra note 31.
184 Two of the lawsuits, Levine v. Reed Elsevier, No. 03-80490 (S.D. Fla. filed May
30, 2003) and Levine v. ChoicePoint, No. 03-80491 (S.D. Fla. filed May 30, 2003) have
been dismissed. Brooks v. Auto Data Direct, No. 03-61063 (S.D. Fla. filed May 29,
2003) is still being litigated.
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administrations. Once information leaves the state administration
office and is transferred to a CDB, the Act's protections do not
apply. Furthermore, the Act does not protect information on the
driver's license, thus allowing businesses to capture and sell data
from identification cards. Some businesses regularly "swipe"
licenses now, collecting all the information off the card, and resell
it.' 85
F. The Self-Regulatory Individual Reference Services Group
Principles
Some documents"' require the law enforcement agency to
comply with the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG)
Principles. 87 The IRSG was formed in order to manage fomenting
criticism regarding companies that sold personal information. 8'
After passage of the GLBA in 1999, the group dissolved, but some
members still adhere to the IRSG Principles. The Principles set
forth a weak framework of protections, allowing companies to sell
non-public personal information "without restriction" to "qualified
subscribers," which include law enforcement agencies. 8 9 So-
called "qualified subscribers" need only state a valid purpose for
obtaining the information and agree to limit redissemination of
information.' 90 Under IRSG Principles, individuals can only opt-
out of the sale of personal information to the "general public," but
ChoicePoint does not consider its customers to be members of the
general public:
ChoicePoint limits access to its information products to
government and businesses with legitimate business purposes
for the data, such as detecting and preventing fraud, performing
legal due diligence, locating criminal suspects, finding missing
185 See SWIPE Project (produced by Beatriz da Costa, Jamie Schulte and Brooke
Singer), at http://www.we-swipe.us/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
186 Reimbursement Agreement Between Agencies, supra note 172.
187 A thorough review of the Principles exceeds the scope of this article. For such a
review, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.ftc.govIbcp/privacy/wkshp97/
irsdoc 1 .htm.
188 Individual Reference Services Group, IRSG Principles (2003), available at
http://west.thomson.com/bottom/irsgprin.asp [hereinafter IRSG Principles].
189 Id.
190 Id.
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children, and managing business risks in a variety of ways. We
feel that removing information from these products would
render them less useful for important business purposes, many
of which ultimately benefit consumers. ChoicePoint DOES
NOT DISTRIBUTE NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION (as
defined in the Principles) TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
PURSUANT TO SECTION V(C) OF THE PRINCIPLES. The
general public therefore has NO direct access to or use of NON-
PUBLIC INFORMATION (as defined in the Principles) from
ChoicePoint whatsoever.'
9
'
The IRSG Principles have been carefully crafted in order to
ensure maximum flexibility by CDBs. They have failed to set
forth a reasonable degree of protection for individuals.
Accordingly, recommended protections are suggested in the next
section to promote privacy.
IV. Recommended Protections
Because collection of information empowers the state and
private businesses over individuals, a system of protections is
recommended for personal data. Law enforcement access to
personal information databases is not inherently problematic. But
there has to be reasonable limits on that access, unless we are
comfortable in becoming a dossier society.
There should be four principal changes in public policy to
better accommodate the rights of individuals in their data. First,
government and businesses should minimize the amount of
information collected on individuals. When these entities collect
less information, it is difficult for CDBs to amass dossiers on
individuals. Second, policymakers should no longer make
distinctions between commercial and government collection of
information. Policymakers often set different standards for
information collection, reasoning that commercial actors pose less
risk than government information collectors. This distinction is no
longer tenable with the cozy relationships between CDBs and the
government described in this article. Third, we must realign
public records policy so that it is compatible with modern
technology. The amount of personal information poured into
191 Letter from Gina Moore, ChoicePoint, to Chris Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy
Information Center (Feb. 21, 2003) (emphasis in original) (on file with author).
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public registers, combined with the absence of limits on use of the
data, poses serious risks to privacy. Fourth, the Privacy Act of
1974 should apply to CDBs. These companies are performing
government functions and allowing the government to have access
to dossiers that otherwise could not be assembled.
A. Minimization
The first principle in privacy protection is the practice of
minimizing data collection. Minimization is the process of
reducing the amount of personal information collected from
individuals. Often, commercial transactions can be performed
with no exchange of recorded personal information. We
experience this every day by engaging in cash transactions. We
even have anonymous authentication systems in the real world,
such as subway passes and movie tickets, that give us access to
services without leaving any identifying information. Minimizing
information collection cuts off dossier-building at the source.
Some companies are voluntarily engaging in minimization as a
result of post 9/11 incursions into civil liberties. Bear Pond Books
in Montpelier, Vermont, for instance, is purging the consumer
records of those who request it, and has erased records held by
members of its readers' club.'92
B. Drop Untenable Distinctions Between Government and
Commercial Collectors
U.S. constitutional, common, and statutory law has long
recognized that government access to personal information
presents risks to individuals' privacy and autonomy. Our nation
also has a deep suspicion of government action and motives, while
maintaining trust in the action of the private sector.
Libertarians and conservatives have employed persuasive
192 David Gram, Associated Press, Vt. Bookseller Purges Files to Avoid Potential
'Patriot Act' Searches (Feb. 20, 2003), available at www.ap.org (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Bookstores have
also fought law enforcement access to book purchasing records with success before the
passage of the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, tit. X (2001). One
example is the Monica Lewinsky case and Tattered Cover. See, e.g., Steven K. Paulson,
Associated Press, Colorado Supreme Court Refuses to Order Book Store to Turn Over
Sales Records (Apr. 8, 2002), available at www.ap.org (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation) (reporting on Tattered Cover).
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arguments to stave off privacy regulation that affects the
commercial sector. They have argued that government collection,
use, and disclosure of information presents more risk than
commercial collection because the government has the power to
arrest, imprison, and even to execute citizens. Commercial
entities, although they hold our mortgages and often control our
employment, arguably present less risk to our autonomy. But as
this article shows, this distinction between the risks of government
and commercial privacy risk is no longer tenable. Commercial
actors provide personal information to the government in a
number of contexts, and often with astonishing alacrity.
The illusory nature of the distinction becomes clear when one
reviews the documents obtained from the government agencies.
Some of the agencies have news clippings that track privacy
limitations on the private sector, or on access to public records.'93
These include news clippings on the right to opt-out under state
laws from sharing Maryland motor vehicle information and the
Supreme Court's upholding of the DPPA. Government agents
understand that limits on the commercial sector will ultimately
reduce their access to personal information. Indeed, one
presentation from the FBI's Public Source Information Project
noted that the passage of the GLBA coupled with litigation in the
D.C. Circuit "[1]imit[ed] access to Credit Header information."194
It further noted that the law has a law enforcement exception, but
"at least one of the credit bureaus has stated that they will no
longer make credit header information."' 95 An IRS memorandum
notes that:
ChoicePoint will provide public record information .... The
coverage is national, but will vary based on the availability of
data from specific states and counties. For example,
ChoicePoint provides DMV data .... However, due to
California's Anti-Stalking laws, that state will not sell DMV
193 See, e.g., Paul W. Valentine, Md. Drivers Rushing to Seal Records, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1997, at Al (documents obtained from the USMS), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf, Frank J. Murray, Justices
Uphold Privacy Law As Way to Protect Motorists: Rule Congress Can Ban Sale of
License Information, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at A3, (documents obtained from the
USMS), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
194 Fact Versus Fiction, supra note 12.
195 Id.
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information to any 3rd-party vendor, and thus no California
DMV data will be available.
196
In an unrelated FOIA request, EPIC obtained an e-mail1 97 from
an employee at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
sent to Total Information Awareness developers John Poindexter
and Robert Popp. 98 The e-mail discusses private-sector CDB
Acxiom as a supplier for Total Information Awareness' mega-
databases of personal information:
Acxiom is the nation's largest commercial data warehouse
company ($1 B/year) with customers like Citibank, Walmart, and
other companies whose names you know. They have a history
of treating privacy issues fairly and they don't advertise at all.
As a result they haven't been hurt as much as ChoicePoint,
Seisint, etc. by privacy concerns and press inquiries.'
99
The e-mail claims that Jennifer Barrett, Acxiom's Chief
Privacy Officer, gave recommendations that would help quell
public scrutiny of the transfer of data from the company to the
government:
One of the key suggestions she made is that people will object to
Big Brother, wide-coverage databases, but they don't object to
use of relevant data for specific purposes that we can all agree
on. Rather than getting all the data for any purpose, we should
start with the goal, tracking terrorists to avoid attacks, and then
identify the data needed (although we can't define all of this, we
can say that our templates and models of terrorists are good
places to start). Already, this guidance has shaped my
thinking.2 °°
The employee continues: "Ultimately, the US [sic] may need
huge databases of commercial transactions that cover the world or
certain areas outside the US [sic]. This information provides
196 Memorandum to All Executives and Managers, supra note 25.
197 E-mail from Doug Dyer, Lt. Col., DARPA/IAO, to John Poindexter & Robert
Popp, DARPA/IAO (May 26, 2002) (document obtained from the Department of
Defense), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/darpaacxiom.pdf
[hereinafter E-mail from Doug Dyer].
198 Total Information Awareness is a now-defunct plan of the Department of
Defense where the agency had planned to use ultra-large databases to find leads on
criminal behavior.
199 E-mail from Doug Dyer, supra note 197.
200 Id.
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economic utility, and thus provides two reasons why foreign
countries would be interested. Acxiom could build this mega-
scale database. 2 °1
In the 1990s, privacy advocates warned the public about the
risks to privacy that were posed by Acxiom and other direct
marketers. The worst case scenario painted by privacy advocates
is contained in the DARPA e-mail described above: a situation
where direct marketers and CDBs cooperated with law
enforcement to create ultra-large databases of personal
information. In response to this criticism, the Direct Marketing
Association (DMA), which is the main industry group
representing commercial collectors of information, touted its self-
regulatory ethical guidelines. Article 32 of the guidelines specifies
that "Marketing data should be used only for marketing
purposes. 2 °2
In numerous representations to the media and regulators, DMA
officials and direct marketers attempted to quell criticism
surrounding the possibility of law enforcement access to
marketing data. As early as 1993, DMA president Jonah Gitlitz
attempted to avoid regulation by promising limited use of direct
marketing information: "It's hard to say what the future of
regulation will be, but our stance is that as long as (direct
marketers) continue to use information for marketing purposes
only, and use it responsibly, there should be no problem in the
implementation of data in direct marketing for advertisers. 2 3
In 1997, the DMA renewed this promise, stating in a filing to
the Federal Trade Commission that:
The Direct Marketing Association has long had a policy
opposing the use of personal data obtained from marketing
transactions for non-marketing purposes. Our Guidelines
therefore limit the sources of the information used by look-up
services. Companies that maintain databases of both marketing
and non-marketing information ensure that information gained
from marketing transactions is not used as an information source
201 Id.
202 DIRECT MARKETING AsSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL BusINESS
PRACTICE, available at http://www.the-dma.org/guidelines/ethicalguidelines.shtml
#collect (last revised Oct. 2003).
203 A Matter Of Privacy, DELANEY REP. (Informed Communications, Inc., New
York, New York), Vol. 4, No. 34 (Aug. 30, 1994), available at 1993 WL 2870174.
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for the look-up database.
The DMA's Guidelines for Personal Information Protection
indicate that personal information collected for marketing
"should only be used" for marketing purposes. This was the
basis for The DMA's response to a December 20, 1994 Federal
Register notice in which the Internal Revenue Service suggested
that agency personnel would begin accessing commercial
databases as part of its Compliance 2000 program. The DMA
filed comments and led a public outcry against the proposal.
DMA stated: "Commercial lists used by DMA members were
created for the purposes of marketing and were never intended
to be used for any other purpose." The IRS backed away from
its intention to use marketing data for law enforcement.
In addition, The DMA Committee on Ethical Business Practice
reviews complaints it occasionally receives regarding the
alleged use of marketing data for non-marketing purposes. The
Ethics Committee reviews these complaints to ensure that
companies' use of marketing data is in accordance with the
guidelines of The DMA.2°4
These promises worked. The federal government adopted a
policy of self-regulation, allowing the continued collection of
personal information in the private sector. These policies in turn
led to our current situation where troves of personal information
are available to both the government and the private sector.
If we are ever unfortunate enough to have George Orwell's
Big Brother2 .5 in the United States, it will be made possible by the
private sector. It is time to drop distinctions between
governmental and commercial collection of personal information.
Both types of collection present the same risks, and it is foolish for
us to continue to act otherwise.
C. Address Emerging Privacy Issues Presented by Personal
Information in Public Records
"Like other vendors in the field, DBT acquires and 'repackages'
204 The DMA did reserve the right to use public records for any purpose. See
DIRECT MKTG. Ass'N, WRITrEN COMMENTS OF THE DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION
BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 15, 1997) (FTC Docket Nos. Database
Study P974806, Consumer Privacy P954807) available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
privacy/wkshp97/comments2/dma.htm.
205 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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publicly-available data into its own formats and makes them
available through its own query and reporting mechanisms. 2 °6
Much of the personal information made available to law
enforcement originates from public records. In a variety of
contexts, the government compels individuals to reveal their
personal information, and then pours it into the public record for
anyone to use for any purpose.2 7 The private sector has collected
the information, repackaged it, and brought it back to the
government full circle.
Privacy expert Robert Ellis Smith published a list of personal
information that appears in court records systems in various
states.2 0 The list includes medical records, Social Security
numbers, victim's names, credit card and account numbers,
psychiatric evaluation reports, juror's names, tax returns, payroll
information, vehicle identification and driver's license numbers,
and family profiles.0 9 It is unfair to have this information
systematically poured into the public record and used for any
purpose by the private sector.
If we wish to limit law enforcement power in this arena, we
must find a policy for public records that reflects Twenty-first
Century technology. Our current policy for public records was
developed in a day where all information was on paper, dispersed
across the country in small courthouses. Information was poorly
indexed; periodically, it was destroyed by fire, improper storage,
or negligence. Access was difficult enough. Aggregation was
impossible.
Today vast quantities of personal information flow into the
public domain from electronic court filings, arrest records, land
sales, and dozens of other interactions that individuals have with
206 Sole Source Justification for Autotrack (Database Technologies), supra note 1.
207 Access and Aggregation, supra note 2, at 1145-49; see also ROGER CLARKE,
PRIVACY AND 'PUBLIC REGISTERS' (May 11, 1997), available at http://www.
anu.edu.aulpeople/Roger.Clarke/DV/PublicRegisters.html; ROBERT GELLMAN, PUBLIC
RECORDS: ACCESS, PRIVACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (May 16, 1995), available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pubrecs/pubrec.html.
208 Robert Ellis Smith, Here's Why People Are Mad, Vol. 29, No. 3 PRIVACY J. 7, 7
(Jan. 2003) (citing Stephen Grimes, administrator of the Judicial Records Center in
Rhode Island), available at http://www.privacyjoumal.net/ (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
209 Id.
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the government. It is not enough, however, to focus only on
electronic public records because the CDBs employ "stringers" to
obtain information from paper records. ChoicePoint has a "staff
of more than 1,500 researchers who obtain public record
information from courthouses and other public sources on a daily
basis. '21°
States that allow broad access to public records are supplying
troves of data to law enforcement. For instance, ChoicePoint's
AutoTrackXP services include thirty-six extra databases on
Florida residents and seven extra on Texans. 21  Access to
information on Florida residents is particularly broad. It includes
marriage records, beverage licensees, concealed weapons permits,
day care licensees, handicapped parking permits, "sweepstakes,"
worker compensation, medical malpractice, and salt water product
licensees.212
Public record policy in America was designed to protect
people from government power; to provide a window into the
operations of officials and thus a check on arbitrary or abusive
exercise of authority. To a large extent, access to public records
has served this purpose. But with electronic access and the power
of aggregation, these policies have increasingly shifted to benefit
the government and businesses. We need to realign these policies
so that less personal information appears in the public record,
while maintaining access to documents that allows for
investigation and oversight of government.
D. The Privacy Act Should Apply to Private Sector
Companies That Sell Information to the Government
The Privacy Act was enacted, in part, because of the specter of
a federal data clearinghouse, one central place where all personal
information could be stored for government access. 213 When the
law was passed in 1974, Congress envisioned that only the
210 ChoicePoint International Data Access Statement of Work, supra note 92.
211 Pricing Schedule D, supra note 31.
212 Id.
213 SEC'Y ADVISORY CoMm., RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS (July 1973), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/c2.htm;
see PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 4.
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government could have the incentive and precious computing
resources to build such a data clearinghouse.
Similarly, dystopian depictions of the future, including those
made in George Orwell's 1984,214 saw government as the entity
hungry for personal information of individuals. The reality is that
arrays of individuals are interested in amassing individuals'
personal information. As Professor Daniel Solove has argued,
public policymakers should see information architecture as less
Orwellian and more Kafkaesque; a dizzying array of private and
public-sector actors have strong interests in tracking individuals
and building dossiers of their personal information.2 5
In passing the Privacy Act, legislators added section m, which
was included in order to prevent the government from simply
farming out data operations in order to avoid the Act's
responsibilities.2 6 Section m, as explained above, applies to
systems of records created by a government, but administered by a
private entity. It does not create rights or responsibilities in data
collected by the private sector and delivered to the government at
its request.
Subsection m falls short of the protections necessary to
safeguard privacy. Companies in the business of collecting
personal information for sale to the government should be held to
Privacy Act responsibilities. It simply does not make sense to
maintain the current framework; one where the private sector has
created the very federal data center that was so feared in the 1960s
and 1970s. Our law should not allow an end-run around
protections where the private sector can escrow troves of personal
information custom-tailored for the government.
V. Conclusion
In passing the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress placed limits on
the Executive branch's collection, maintenance, and use of
personal information. But those protections have failed to meet
Congress' intent because the private sector has done what the
government has been prohibited from doing. Private sector
214 See ORWELL, supra note 205.
215 Daniel Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1398 (2001).
216 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (2000).
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commercial data brokers have built massive data centers with
personal information custom-tailored to law enforcement agents.
This has upset the balance of power between individuals and the
government, allowing the police to peer into our lives from their
desktops. Current privacy law does little to establish rights and
responsibilities in the collection and maintenance of this
information, in part because the government has employed artful
interpretations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act to avoid privacy
protections.
The release and use of public records containing personal
information must be reevaluated, with three goals in mind. First,
in order to promote privacy while accommodating legitimate law
enforcement investigations, policymakers should establish a
framework of rights that limit the collection of information.
Second, they should cease to make policy distinctions between
government and private sector collections of information. Third,
the Privacy Act should apply to companies that regularly sell
personal information to the government. Only after these
protections are in place will "personal" information truly be
personal.
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